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Whistleblowing: How Courts Should Referee Constructive Discharge 
 
I. Introduction  
 
Constructive discharge claims frequently arise under acts such as Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.1  That is, many such  claims result from 
harassment or discrimination in the workplace.2  While retaliation claims for whistleblowing often 
arise from cases where an employee is fired by her employer, “constructive” discharge occurs 
where the employer makes the working conditions intolerable in a conscious, or unconscious, 
effort to make the employee resign.3  However, in the recent case of Smith v. LHC Grp., Inc., the 
Sixth Circuit analyzed the meaning of constructive discharge in relation to “whistleblowing” for 
fraud under the False Claims Act, and the decision raises some distinct issues under that statute.4  
Not only did the court notably clarify that constructive discharge is in fact prohibited by the anti-
retaliation clause of the False Claims Act, but it also clarified that management’s ignoring a 
whistleblower’s claims may render continuing employment untenable.5  In that situation, the False 
Claims Act offers a potential remedy should the employee decide to resign.6   
The Sixth Circuit addressed the issue in Smith of what constitutes constructive discharge.7  
One question was whether an employer must have had a specific intention for the employee to 
resign in order for the doctrine to apply.8  With that question in mind, the court explained three 
separate approaches towards constructive discharge, two objective approaches and one subjective 
approach.  The first objective approach, which was ultimately adopted by the Smith court, requires 
 
1 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et. seq. (1967); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C §§ 2000e, et. seq. (1964). 
2 See 1 LARSON on EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 15.08 (2018).  
3 See e.g., Smith v. LHC Grp., Inc., 727 F. App’x 100 (6th Cir. 2018).   
4 Smith, 727 F. App’x 100 (6th Cir. 2018). 
5 Id.  
6 Civil actions for false claims, 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730 (2018). 
7 Smith v. LHC Grp., Inc., 727 F. App’x 100 (6th Cir. 2018). 
8 Id. at 104. 
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only an employee’s resignation to be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the employer’s 
actions.9  The second objective approach acknowledged by the court ignores employer intent and 
finds constructive discharge solely when the working conditions were so intolerable that a 
reasonable person would resign; it does not consider the employer’s viewpoint at all once the 
protected conduct has taken place.10  The third, subjective approach, requires the employer to have 
a subjective intent for the employee to quit.11   
Part I of this note gives a full background and overview of relevant topics and issues.  First, 
it will discuss the history and relevant provisions of the False Claims Act.  The note will next 
discuss whistleblowing and retaliatory discharge.  Then, the note will outline constructive 
discharge.   Part I will conclude by discussing the Smith case, its facts, analysis, and holding.  Part 
II will then turn to the different approaches towards constructive discharge.  The note questions 
whether an employee can be “made whole” if an objective, foreseeable consequences test is not 
adopted, as in Smith.  The note advises against a subjective intent test and argues that the Sixth 
Circuit test creates the best balance for both employees and employers, and also encourages the 
“right” amount of whistleblowing.  Part III will further evaluate and recommend a legislative 
approach going forward.  Part IV, the Conclusion, will quickly summarize this note’s views.  
II. History and Relevant Provisions of the False Claims Act  
The False Claims Act (“FCA”) has often been amended throughout its existence.12  It 
originated in 1863 when it was passed by Congress and signed by Abraham Lincoln during the 
Civil War.13  The FCA was directed at “that class of wretches” who were cheating the government 
 
9 Id. at 106.  
10 Id. at 105.  
11 Smith v. LHC Grp., Inc., 727 F. App’x 100, 104 (6th Cir. 2018). 
12Federal False Claims Act and Qui Tam Litigation, L.J. PRESS § 2.01 (2018).  
13 Peter W. Morgan, Legal Theory: The Undefined Crime of Lying to Congress: Ethics Reform and the Rule of Law, 
86 NW. U.L. REV. 177, 211 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955 (1863)).   
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by presenting false claims for payment.14  It is also called the “Lincoln Law.”15  The core purpose 
of the statute is to make liable any person who “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a 
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.”16  But the FCA authorizes recovery for fraud 
either through the government itself or through individuals acting for it.17  Therefore, the FCA 
allows an individual to bring an action on behalf of herself and the United States government.18  
This is known as a “qui tam” action.19  The FCA incentivizes such action by offering a substantial 
portion of the government’s recovery to the individual bringing the qui tam action.20   
But Congress has enacted several amendments to the FCA, and one important amendment 
occurred in 1986 when Congress provided protection for whistleblowers.21  Thus, the FCA 
provides relief for employees who resist fraud against the Government by an employer.22  An 
employee who is “discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner 
 
14 Id.  
15 United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731, 736 (1998). 
16 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2018).  
17 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730 (2018). 
18 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(c) (2018).  
19 The term “qui tam” refers to the Latin expression “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hae parte 
sequitur,” which translates to, “he who brings an action for the king as well as for himself.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1251 (7th ed. 1999).  
20 1-6 WHISTLEBLOWING and RETALIATION § 6.2 (2014). The individual does not even have to be personally harmed 
by the alleged wrongful act.  
21 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729 (Amendments); United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731, 736 (1998) 
(citing S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273).  
22 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(h) provides:  
 
(1) In general.--Any employee, contractor, or agent shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make that employee, 
contractor, or agent whole, if that employee, contractor, or agent is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, 
harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment because of lawful 
acts done by the employee, contractor, agent or associated others in furtherance of an action under this section or 
other efforts to stop 1 or more violations of this subchapter. 
 
(2) Relief-- Relief under paragraph (1) shall include reinstatement with the same seniority status that employee, 
contractor, or agent would have had but for the discrimination, 2 times the amount of back pay, interest on the back 
pay, and compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, including litigation costs 
and reasonable attorneys’ fees. An action under this subsection may be brought in the appropriate district court of 
the United States for the relief provided in this subsection. 
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discriminated against” is entitled to any relief necessary to make herself whole, and this is in 
addition to any share in the proceeds of a successful qui tam suit.23  
Recognizing the utility of whistleblowers, many states have also enacted their own state 
law False Claims Acts with qui tam provisions.24  For example, New Jersey’s False Claims Act 
closely mirrors the federal False Claims Act.25  The New Jersey FCA also offers a financial reward 
to any whistleblowers who bring an ultimately successful claim.26  Overall, the False Claims Act 
has proved very successful for the United States Government since its enactment, recovering 
billions of dollars by whistleblowers bringing FCA law suits.27  
III. Whistleblowing and Retaliatory Discharge in the United States 
Most people have a common understanding of what a whistleblower is, though many might 
be under the impression you have to go to the police or the media.  Generally a whistleblower is 
someone who exposes activity, usually by an employer, that she believes to be illegal, against 
policy, or even morally abhorrent.28  A famous example of a whistleblower in United States history 
is Mark Felt, the FBI agent who provided information to the Washington Post that led to the 
exposure of President Richard Nixon’s involvement in the Watergate scandal that eventually led 
 
23 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730 (h). 
24 James B. Helmer Jr. & Erin M. Campbell, Jury Instructions for False Claims Act Cases, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 943, 
951 (2016).  
25 N.J. Stat. § 2A:32C-1 – 2A:32C-18 (2018).  
26 N.J. Stat. § 2A:32C-7. Under N.J. Stat. Section 2A:32C-7(a), if the Attorney General proceeds with the action and 
prevails, the court can order the distribution to the whistleblower between 15 – 25% of the proceeds recovered. 
Under N.J. Stat. Section 2A:32C-7(d), if the Attorney General does not proceed with the action and the 
whistleblower proceeds with the action himself, the court may distribute between 25 – 30% of the proceeds to the 
person who brought the action.  
27 Marc S. Raspanti & David M. Laigaie, Current Practice and Procedure Under the Whistleblower Provisions of 
the Federal False Claims Act, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 23, 42 (1998).  
28 Black’s Law Dictionary defines Whistle-Blower as “An employee who reports employer wrongdoing to a 
governmental or law-enforcement agency.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY FIFTH POCKET EDITION (1996). 
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to the President’s resignation.29  Felt’s involvement as an informant was so controversial that it 
remained a secret for over thirty years before Felt’s identity was revealed.30   
Despite the Mark Felt controversy, views on whistleblowing have often changed.  More 
recently, whistleblowing is encouraged to keep people honest and keep employers in line for fear 
of “being told on.”  However, whistleblowing is still burdened with resistance and complications.  
The most common obstacle is fear of retaliation by one’s employer (i.e. termination). Other 
concerns revolve around fear of retaliation from colleagues, such as harassment or hazing.31  
Hence, many states and federal statutes have implemented protection for whistleblowers to combat 
these exact concerns.   
While whistleblower statutes have been around for a while, the False Claims Act is one of 
the more recent laws in the United States that has adopted anti-retaliatory provisions to protect 
whistleblowers who disclose fraud against the government.32  The act safeguards both internal 
whistleblowers, those who report violations within the company to their superiors, and external 
whistleblowers, those who report externally to the government—not just those who report to the 
media or police.33   
Further whistleblower protection was enacted following the Enron scandal in the early 
2000s, which led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) in 2002.34  Following SOX, several other 
whistleblower protections were introduced, including provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act (“Dodd-
 
29 Tim Weiner, W. Mark Felt, Watergate Deep Throat, Dies at 95, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 19, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/19/washington/19felt.html.  
30 Id.  
31 See e.g. Simas v. First Citizens’ Fed. Credit Union, 170 F.3d 37, 52 n.12 (1st Cir. 1999) (“While social ostracism 
alone is rarely actionable, professional ostracism may be, at least where the plaintiff can show that defendants 
incited or encouraged coworkers to shun him, and plaintiff suffered some material harm resulting from his inability 
to consult with his colleagues on matters of business.”) 
32 Richard Fincher, Mediating Whistleblower Disputes; Integrating the Emotional and Legal Challenges, DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION JOURNAL (AAA) 64, 1, 62 (2009).  
33 Lex K. Larson, 3 UNJUST DISMISSAL § 11.03 (2018). 
34 1-1 WHISTLEBLOWING and RETALIATION § 1.1-1.2 (2014).  
 7 
Frank”), which seeks to provide incentives to report on fraud in publicly traded companies.35  
Somewhat similar to the FCA, Dodd-Frank includes a “bounty” provision, which allows a 
whistleblower to collect a portion of the government’s recovery.36  The trend of active enforcement 
of whistleblower claims by government agencies has only increased over the years.37 
Whistleblower provisions have not been limited to federal statutes and regulation, given 
the limitations of federal statutes, and a great deal of protection remains rooted in state law.38  As 
with any state regulations, the states widely vary in the protections and remedies offered, who is 
covered (for example, public vs. private employees), what conduct is protected, and the standard 
of belief that is required before disclosure is protected.39  On top of the New Jersey False Claims 
Act mentioned above, for instance, New Jersey also has the Conscientious Employee Protection 
Act (“CEPA”), also known as the “Whistleblower Act.”40  CEPA prohibits employers from 
retaliating against employees who disclose, object to, or refuse participation in activities that the 
employee “reasonably believes” is illegal or abhorrent to public policy.41  To state a prima facie 
case under CEPA, a plaintiff must establish that:  
(1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer’s conduct was violating 
either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of 
public policy; (2) he or she performed a “whistle-blowing” activity described in 
[NJ CEPA]; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and 
(4) a causal connection exists between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse 
employment action.42 
 
 
35 1-1 WHISTLEBLOWING and RETALIATION § 1.2 (2014).  
36 Id.  
37 1-1 WHISTLEBLOWING and RETALIATION § 1.4 (2014). This includes agencies such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Department of Labor, Department of Justice, and Internal Revenue Service.  
38 1-8 WHISTLEBLOWING and RETALIATION § 8.1 (2014).  
39 1-8 WHISTLEBLOWING and RETALIATION § 8.2 (2014).  
40 N.J. Stat. § 34:19-3 (2018).  
41 David Rich, What are the Elements of a New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act Claim? (Oct 26, 
2015), https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/labor-employment/b/labor-employment-top-blogs/posts/what-
are-the-elements-of-a-new-jersey-conscientious-employee-protection-act-claim.   
42 Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 462 (N.J. 2003).  
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CEPA has proven its broad range of protection over New Jersey whistleblowers, especially 
with the New Jersey Supreme Court showing willingness to accept an objectively 
reasonable belief of a violation of law, rather than proving such a violation actually 
occurred.43  The legislature and judiciary are becoming increasingly employee-friendly. 
In order to establish a claim for unlawful retaliation under most federal standards, an 
employee typically must establish three elements: (1) the employee engaged in a protected activity; 
(2) the employer took some sufficiently serious adverse action against the employee; and (3) a 
causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.44  For example,  
the employee may be discharged because of her lawful acts seeking to stop what is reasonably 
perceived to be violations of law, rather than for some legitimate, non-retaliatory reason.45  
Whistleblowing has become a common practice in the United States, protecting the government 
from fraud and saving it money along the way.  However, whistleblowing frequently poses 
challenges for the informant’s job security.  
IV. Constructive Discharge  
Employment in the United States is, typically, on at “at-will” basis.46  This means “an 
employee may be terminated for a ‘good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.’”47  However, 
many federal and state laws identify particular discriminatory or unlawful reasons as exceptions 
 
43 Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 464 (2003) (“[A] plaintiff must set forth facts that would support an 
objectively reasonable belief that a violation has occurred. In other words, when a defendant requests that the trial 
court determine as a matter of law that a plaintiff’s belief was not objectively reasonable, the trial court must make a 
threshold determination that there is a substantial nexus between the complained-of conduct and a law or public 
policy identified by the court or the plaintiff.”) See also, 1 LITTLER MENDELSON’S THE NATIONAL EMPLOYER § 7.3 
(2014).  
44 1-2 WHISTLEBLOWING and RETALIATION § 2.1 (2014); see also Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 610 F.3d 
434, 441 (7th Cir. 2010).  
45 See generally, Smith v. LHC Grp., Inc., 727 F. App’x 100, 109-110 (6th Cir. 2018) (Bush, concurring).  
46 National Conference of State Legislatures, The At-Will Presumption and Exceptions to the Rule (last visited Feb. 
8, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-overview.aspx.  
47 Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 606 (2008).  
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from the at-will rule.48  Constructive discharge is one of those exceptions if applicable under the 
specific circumstances, such as following sufficiently pervasive harassment and retaliation.  The 
constructive discharge concept originated in the labor-law field in the 1930's by the National Labor 
Relations Board (“NLRB”).49  The NLRB introduced the doctrine to combat situations in which 
employers pressured employees to resign, often by creating intolerable working conditions, in 
retaliation for employees' engaging in concerted  activities or to discourage employees from 
unionizing.50  The NLRB requires employees to establish two elements to prove a constructive 
discharge.51  First, an employer burdens the employee in a way that is intended to cause, and 
ultimately creates, a change in his condition “so difficult or unpleasant as to force him to 
resign.”52  Second, it must be shown that those burdens were imposed because of the employee's 
protected activities.53   
By 1964, the year Title VII was enacted, the doctrine was solidly established in the federal 
courts for National Labor Relations Act cases.54  But it was not until  2004 that the Supreme Court 
determined that Title VII also encompasses employer liability for a constructive discharge.55  In 
Pa. State Police v. Suders, the plaintiff alleged that her supervisors sexually harassed her so 
severely that she was forced to resign.56  The Court determined that, to show constructive 
discharge, Suders must show that the abusive working environment was so intolerable that her 
 
48 XPERTHR EMPLOYMENT LAW MANUAL 3329 (2018); see also Nguyen v. Tech. & Sci. Application, Inc., 981 
S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex. App. 1998) (holding that the Sabine Pilot exception to the employment-at-will doctrine 
applies to employees who are constructively discharged for the sole reason that they refuse to commit a crime.) 
49 Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 152. (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
52 Id. at 152 (quoting Crystal Princeton Refining Co., 222 N. L. R. B. 1068, 1069 (1976)). 
53 Id. at 152-53 (quoting Crystal Princeton Refining Co., 222 N. L. R. B. 1068, 1069 (1976)). 
54 Id. at 142.  
55  Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 133 (2004) (“Although this Court has not had occasion earlier to hold 
that a claim for constructive discharge lies under Title VII, we have recognized constructive discharge in the labor-
law context.”) 
56 Suders, 542 U.S. at 133. 
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resignation was a fitting response.57  It was not enough that the harassment was sufficiently severe 
or pervasive enough to be actionable; rather, it must also be so intolerable that a reasonable person 
in Suders’ position would have felt compelled to resign.58  The Court also held that the inquiry is 
objective under a “reasonable person in the employee’s position” standard.59   
As the constructive discharge doctrine has developed, determining a constructive discharge 
occurred is often difficult.  The circumstances may not be as clear-cut as they were in Suders, 
where the Supreme Court classified the working conditions as “a ‘worse case’ harassment 
scenario, harassment ratcheted up to the breaking point.”60  Because the employer does not fire the 
employee in a constructive discharge, it is often difficult to assess retaliation given the less than 
“clear-cut” evidence of intent to force the employee to resign or foreseeable consequence that the 
employee may quit.  It is also difficult to determine when retaliation is sufficiently severe enough 
to justify resigning in the first place.  An employer’s action may clearly constitute retaliation, but 
may not clear the threshold of being “sufficiently severe.”  Overall, while constructive discharge 
claims are difficult to win, the courts have begun to show more leniency in favor of employees in 
contemporary opinions.61   
Generally speaking, constructive discharge occurs when an employee resigns given 
intolerable or hostile working conditions.62  The conditions must be “so intolerable that a 
reasonable person would resign.”63  There is not one concrete definition of what constitutes 
 
57 Id. at 134.  
58 Id.  
59 Id. at 141 (The inquiry is objective: Did working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the 
employee's position would have felt compelled to resign?”)  
60 Id. at 147-48.  
61For example, in 2016 the Supreme Court held that the trigger date for the statute of limitations is the date the 
employee resigns, rather than the date of the last alleged discriminatory act.  Green v. Brennan, 136 S. Ct. 1769, 
1772 (2016) (“[A] constructive-discharge claim is no different from an ordinary wrongful-discharge claim, which 
accrues only after the employee is fired.”) 
62 XPERTHR EMPLOYMENT LAW MANUAL 3329 (2018).  
63 Green v. Brennan, 136 S. Ct. 1769, 1779 (2016).  
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constructive discharge.  “Intolerable working conditions” therefore vary depending on the context 
or the applicable statute, and are generally coupled with employer intent or foreseeability that these 
conditions or actions may lead to the employee’s resignation.  For example, under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, intolerable conditions may include, but are not limited to, (1) actual threats 
of discharge, (2) coercive conduct relating to an employee’s retirement or use of disability or 
medical leave, or (3) requests to submit to medical examinations.64  Under Title VII, sufficiently 
egregious sexual harassment often creates an intolerable working condition.65  In the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act context, an example of intolerable working conditions might 
be threatening by the employer of a drastic increase in hours if the employee does not retire.66  
Under the False Claims Act, as seen in Smith, disregarding an employee’s concerns of fraud can 
create an intolerable condition.67  While there are many ways to create intolerable working 
conditions, courts consider that every job has its frustrations and that employees are not guaranteed 
an entirely stress-free work environment.68   
All circuits require the conditions to be intolerable or unbearable.  In addition, circuits view 
the intolerability of the conditions from the perspective of a reasonable person under similar 
circumstances.69  Therefore, an employee is not justified in quitting if he is unreasonably or 
irrationally sensitive to his working conditions.70 
 
64Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, What Constitutes "Constructive Discharge" Under Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990 (42 U.S.C.A. § 12101), 182 A.L.R. Fed. 609, 2a.   
65 Thomas Fusco, Annotation, What constitutes constructive discharge of employee due to sex discrimination so as 
to violate Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2), 116 A.L.R. Fed. 1, 5a. 
66 Alan G. Skutt, Annotation, Circumstances which warrant finding of constructive discharge in cases under Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.), 93 A.L.R. Fed. 10, 2a. 
67 Smith v. LHC Grp., Inc., 727 F. App'x 100, 104 (6th Cir. 2018).  
68 Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985).  
69 Id. (“Intolerability of working conditions, as the circuits uniformly recognize, is assessed by the objective standard 
of whether a "reasonable person" in the employee's position would have felt compelled to resign.”) 
70 Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981).  
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Courts differ, however, in their approaches to whether the employer must have intended to 
cause resignation by rendering the conditions intolerable.71  Some circuits require proof that the 
employer deliberately intended to make the employee resign by making the working conditions 
unbearable, such as with the test by the NLRB listed above.72  Other circuits apply the test found 
in Suders, which looks only at whether a reasonable person would have found the conditions 
unbearable.73  Lastly, some circuits, such as the court in Smith, make a broad reading of “intent” 
and inquire whether the employer could have reasonably foreseen that its conduct and the working 
conditions would result in the employee’s resignation.74 
V. Overview of Smith v. LHC Grp., Inc.  
Smith v. LHC Grp., Inc., decided by the Sixth Circuit in March 2018, involved defendants 
LHC Group (“LHC”) and Kentucky LV, LLC (collectively “Defendants”), home healthcare 
providers in Kentucky that provide services to referred patients in exchange for payments from 
Medicare, Medicaid, or private payors.75  Sue Smith (“Plaintiff”) worked for her employers, the 
Defendants, as  Director of Nursing.76  Smith was involved in the enrollment process for accepting 
new patients.77  She alleged that she discovered that other employees regularly bypassed the proper 
procedures for admitting new patients.78  For example, if LHC could not accommodate patients’ 
medical needs, the employee would admit them regardless and change the doctor’s order to match 
the availability of clinical staff.79  Other employees admitted patients without the proper 
 
71 1 Larson on Employment Discrimination § 15.08 (2019) 
72 Id.  
73 Id.  
74 Id. 
75 Smith v. LHC Grp., Inc., 727 F. App’x 100, 104 (6th Cir. 2018).  
76 Id.  
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 102-03.  
79 Id. at 103.  
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documentation from a medical doctor.80  When Smith reported the fraud to management, it 
allegedly ignored her complaints, continued to tolerate the fraud, and actually welcomed the profit 
it brought to LHC.81  According to Smith, the scheme brought in an extra $6 million each year.82  
Eventually, Smith resigned because she felt it was her only option to avoid personal liability for 
committing fraud and violating the FCA.83   
Smith sued her employers, LHC Group, Inc. and Kentucky LV, LLC, on claims of violating 
the False Claims Act by constructively discharging her in retaliation for her reports and for 
violating Kentucky state law for wrongful discharge.84  Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under 
the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which the district court granted on all counts.85  Smith 
appealed the dismissal.86  The main issue on appeal was whether Smith adequately alleged that she 
suffered an adverse employment action when she felt it necessary to resign her job as Director of 
Nursing because her employer continued to defraud the government.87   
LHC claimed it did not fire or demote Smith, nor seek her resignation or take any adverse 
employment action that could possibly equate to discharge or liability under the FCA.88  Smith did 
not dispute this other than to claim that, because Defendants ignored her complaints, she had to 
quit to avoid being implicated in any legal action against her employer.89  She claimed this was 
constructive discharge.90   
 
80 Id.  
81 Smith v. LHC Grp., Inc., 727 F. App’x 100, 103 (6th Cir. 2018). 
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 Id.  
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Smith v. LHC Grp., Inc., 727 F. App’x 100, 103 (6th Cir. 2018). 
88 Id.  
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 103-04 (citing Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1983) (“Constructive discharge occurs when 
‘working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes 
would have felt compelled to resign.’”)  
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The Sixth Circuit found that a jury could reasonably find that the employers created 
intolerable conditions by ignoring Smith’s complaints, using a “reasonable person in the 
[p]laintiff’s position” test.91  The court distinguished between the three commonly applied 
approaches to constructive discharge: (1) an objective standard where the employer should have 
been able to reasonably foresee the working conditions would cause an employee to resign, (2) an 
objective standard that does not consider the employer’s intent or foreseeability at all, and (3) a 
subjective standard that looks at the employer’s specific, or subjective, intent to cause the 
employee to resign.92  The Sixth Circuit ultimately decided that the constructive discharge test 
should follow the first approach, an objective standard that considers the foreseeable consequences 
of the employer’s actions.93  The reasons and implications of this decision will be discussed in 
detail below.  
VI. Analysis  
The threshold question was whether constructive discharge is a form of prohibited 
retaliation in the anti-retaliation provision of the False Claims Act.94  The Sixth Circuit in Smith 
answered that question in the affirmative.95  The court held that a reasonable jury could find that 
an employee is seriously harmed when her employer continues its fraud and subjects the employee 
to possible prosecution, loss of her nursing license, and loss of her reputation.96  Therefore, 
ignoring a whistleblower’s disclosures is not merely a passive act, but instead an affirmative choice 
that can give rise to a retaliation claim.   
 
91 Smith, 727 F. App’x at 104 (6th Cir. 2018). 
92 Id.  
93 Id. at 104-06.  
94 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730. (“Any employee, contractor, or agent shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make that 
employee, contractor, or agent whole, if that employee, contractor, or agent is discharged, demoted, suspended, 
threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment 
because of lawful acts done by the employee”). 
95 Smith v. LHC Grp., Inc., 727 F. App’x 100 (6th Cir. 2018). 
96 Id. at 106.  
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The other leading question in Smith therefore became whether the constructive discharge 
doctrine requires that the employer have a conscious specific intention for the employee to resign.97  
The Sixth Circuit answers that question in the negative.98  The analysis below will discuss the 
different views about this requirement, the implications of each variation of the doctrine, and why 
all courts should adopt the Sixth Circuit’s objective approach in Smith.  
A. Constructive Discharge –Objective, Foreseeable Consequence view in Smith 
Constructive discharge occurs “when working conditions would have been so difficult or 
unpleasant that a reasonable person in a similar position would have felt compelled to resign.”99  
This must be analyzed from the perspective of a “reasonable person in the position that [the 
plaintiff] was in at the time of the discharge.”100  Circuits often attempt to address what is 
reasonable.  The Eleventh Circuit, for example, states that “while ‘hurt feelings’ can form part of 
a constructive discharge scenario, it is not reasonable for an employee to resign after one day’s 
disappointment given the circumstances which were present” in that particular case.101  
Furthermore, “[p]art of an employee’s obligation to be reasonable is an obligation not to assume 
the worst, and not to jump to conclusions too fast.”102  Some courts will not find constructive 
discharge if the employee does not provide a reasonable amount of time for the employer to amend 
the situation or take corrective action.103  For example, if a plaintiff complains of sexual harassment 
by a fellow employee but quits before allowing the employer to conduct an internal investigation, 
 
97 Id. 
98Id. 
99 Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2s 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1982) (quoting Borque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th 
Cir. 1980)).  
100 Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 770 F.2d 47, 50 (6th Cir. 1985).  
101 Garner v. Wal-Mart Stores, 807 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1987).  
102 Id. 
103 See e.g. Trierweiler v. Wells Fargo Bank, 639 F.3d 456, 460-61 (8th Cir. 2011); Duncan v. GMC, 300 F.3d 928, 
935 (8th Cir. 2002).  
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a court may not find a constructive discharge.104  Other courts have found that no constructive 
discharge exists when an employee refuses an offer by the employee to be moved or transferred 
from the intolerable or harassing environment.105  Lastly, courts have held that, even if other 
employees undergoing the same harassment or issues do not quit, a constructive discharge claim 
does not automatically fail.106    
Courts acknowledge that constructive discharges fully depend on the facts of the case.107  
In Smith, the plaintiff quit her job to avoid suspicion and potential future investigation by the 
United States Government.108  As Director of Nursing, Smith was required to allocate clinical staff 
to new patients and fill out health insurance paperwork.109  Smith was aware that other employees 
regularly bypassed the proper procedures for admitting patients and ensuring patients had the 
proper evaluations and documentation.110  Given her knowledge that her employers were 
perpetuating health care fraud regardless of her complaints, the plaintiff felt she could either quit 
or continue to participate in a scheme she believed was defrauding the government.111  Therefore, 
Smith quit her job to avoid implication in fraud, which the Sixth Circuit found any reasonable 
person in those circumstances would have done to protect her nursing license and reputation.112  
To show the reasonableness of Smith’s actions, the Sixth Circuit distinguished Smith’s 
circumstances from a different case where a nurse quit because of unhygienic conditions at the 
 
104 Duncan v. GMC, 300 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[S]o a person may out of desperation or simple stubbornness 
cling to his job despite provocations that would cause the average person to quit in disgust.”)  
105 Wonders v. United Tax Grp., Ltd. Liab. Co., No. 13-80148-CIV, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154892, at *18-19 (S.D. 
Fla. Oct. 29, 2013). 
106 Hunt v. City of Markham, 219 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 2000).  
107 Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2s 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1982)  
108 Smith v. LHC Grp., Inc., 727 F. App’x 100, 101 (6th Cir. 2018). 
109 Id. at 103.  
110 Id.  
111 Id.  
112 Id. at 106.  
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facility.113  The court in U.S. ex rel. Absher v. Momence Meadows Nursing Ctr., Inc. found that 
the nurse herself was not required to provide substandard care or involve herself in her coworker’s 
substandard care.114  Smith, on the other hand, could not distance herself from the fraud taking 
place and was left to worry about being charged with fraud by the government if she were to 
continue her everyday activities and duties.115   
Once a court determines that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would have felt 
compelled to resign, a court must determine the proper standard for employer intent.  In Smith, the 
Sixth Circuit ultimately adopted a broad reading of intent and focused primarily on foreseeable 
consequences.116  With this, the court first analyzed the Restatement (Second) of Torts as 
persuasive authority on the fraudulent issue, which states:  
Intent is not . . . limited to consequences which are desired. If the actor knows that 
the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still 
goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the 
result.117 
 
The court used the Restatement as a starting point to discuss the history of constructive 
discharge in the Sixth Circuit, which generally holds that an employer has the requisite intent when 
it can be shown that quitting was a foreseeable consequence of the employer’s actions.118  This 
constructive discharge conceptualization originated from developments in the Tenth Circuit in 
Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co.119  The court in Irving used two tests, looking at whether (1) a 
reasonable person in similar circumstances would view the working conditions as intolerable and 
 
113 Id. at 104. (analogizing to U.S. ex rel. Absher v. Momence Meadows Nursing Ctr., Inc., 764 F.3d 699, 716 (7th 
Cir. 2014)). 
114 U.S. ex rel. Absher v. Momence Meadows Nursing Ctr., Inc., 764 F.3d 699, 716 (7th Cir. 2014).  
115 Smith, 727 F. App’x at 104.  
116 Id.  
117 Smith, 727 F. App’x at 104-05 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS § 8A cmt. B (AM. LAW INST. 1995).  
118 Id. at 105. see also Moore v. KUKA Welding Sys. & Robot Corp., 171 F.3d 1073, 1080-81 (6th Cir. 1999). 
119 Smith, 727 F. App’x at 105 (citing Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 172 (10th Cir. 1982)). 
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(2) the employer deliberately created the conditions to force the employee to quit.120  The Tenth 
Circuit in Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp. revised the concept back to one, objective standard similar to the 
one used by the Fifth Circuit in Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co.121 
In Bourque, the plaintiff filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and claimed 
constructive discharge when her employer discriminated against her on the basis of her sex for 
failing to pay the plaintiff an equal amount to her male counterparts.122  The Fifth Circuit framed 
the general rule for constructive discharge as an employer making an employee’s working 
conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation.123  “The trier 
of fact must be satisfied that the … working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant 
that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign.”124  The 
employee alleging constructive discharge does not need to prove that her employer took actions 
with the subjective intention of forcing her to quit.125  Instead, the intent requirement can be 
satisfied if the employee’s resignation was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the 
employer’s actions.126   
In adopting this standard from Borque, the Sixth Circuit determined that Smith’s repeated 
complaints to LHC management regarding the illegal activity, and management’s failure to correct 
the violations, should have put LHC on notice that a foreseeable consequence might be Smith’s 
resignation.127  Not only would she be at risk of losing her nursing license if the fraud was realized, 
 
120 Irving, 689 F.2d at 172.  
121 Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 343 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing Bourque v. Powell Electrical Manufacturing 
Co., 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980)).  
122 Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1980). 
123 Id. at 65.  
124 Id. (citing Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1977)). 
125 Bourque, 617 F.2d at 65.  
126 Id.  see also Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 344 (10th Cir. 1986); Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2s 427, 432 
(6th Cir. 1982).  
127 Smith v. LHC Grp., Inc., 727 F. App’x 100, 106 (6th Cir. 2018).  
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but she would be at risk of committing fraud against the United States government through her 
continued participation.128  As the Director of Nursing, Smith relied on clinical staff members’ 
submissions to determine which patients needed what treatment.129 Smith knew these employees 
were committing fraud, so even though she was not primarily responsible, her participation in the 
procedure implicated her in the scheme.  Smith repeatedly complained to management about the 
fraud, meaning her employers were on notice that her resignation would be a reasonable, 
foreseeable consequence of the fraud.130 
B. Constructive Discharge – Objective Test with No Additional Requirement  
 
Some circuits apply a more precise objective test that determines only whether the working 
conditions became so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign.131  Most 
notably, the United States Supreme Court has omitted employer intent from its definition of 
constructive discharge.132  This objective test is similar to the test above, but these courts do not 
add either an intent or foreseeability requirement on the part of the employer after the protected 
conduct has occurred.133  In Suders, the Supreme Court explained that a constructive discharge 
does not need to be effected through an official act of the company.134  In addition, the Court 
declined to impose any specific intent or reasonable foreseeability requirement on the part of the 
employer.135  Therefore, this standard is entirely objective, as the courts do not put weight on 
employer intent or on the employee’s subjective beliefs, “no matter how sincerely held.”136  The 
 
128 Id. at 104.  
129 Id. at 102.  
130 Id. at 103.  
131 See e.g. Knappenberger v. City of Phoenix, 566 F.3d 936, 940 (9th Cir. 2009); Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 
F.3d 526, 536 (7th Cir. 1993).  
132 Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 153 (2004).  
133 Smith v. LHC Grp., Inc., 727 F. App’x 100, 105 (6th Cir. 2018). 
134 Suders, 542 U.S. at 148.  
135 Id. at 153 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
136 EEOC v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 774 F.3d 127, 134 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 
F.3d 7, 28 (1st Cir. 2002)). 
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First Circuit court calls the test the objective “reasonable person” standard.137  The focus, therefore, 
is not on the employer at all; instead, the decision falls on whether the decision to resign, from the 
employee’s perspective, was objectively reasonable.138  
C. Constructive Discharge – Subjective Intent Requirement 
 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky adopted a subjective 
intent test when first deciding Smith.139  In earlier cases, the Sixth Circuit had set forth a few rules. 
First, the employee must show evidence that the employer deliberately created intolerable working 
conditions, as perceived by a reasonable person, such that a reasonable person would have felt 
compelled to resign.140  The employer must have done so with the intention of forcing the 
employee to resign.141  Factors to assess can include (1) a demotion ; (2) a reduction in salary; (3) 
a reduction in job responsibilities; (4) a reassignment to menial or degrading work; (5) a 
reassignment to work under a younger supervisor; (6) badgering, harassment, or humiliation by 
the employer calculated to encourage the employee’s resignation; or (7) offers of early retirement 
or continued employment on terms less favorable than the employee’s former status.142  
In earlier cases, the Sixth Circuit required the employee to also prove the employer did 
these actions with the intention of forcing the employee to quit.143  The actions must be deliberate 
and followed by the employee’s actual resignation.144  Some courts applying a subjective intent 
 
137 EEOC v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 774 F.3d 127, 134 (1st Cir. 2014). 
138 1 LARSON on EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 15.08 (2018 
139 Smith v. LHC Grp., Inc., No. 5:17-15-KKC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101742 (E.D. Ky. June 30, 2017). 
140 Saroli v. Automation & Modular Components, Inc., 405 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2005).  
141 Id. at 451. 
142 Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 569 (6th Cir. 2001). 
143 Saroli, 405 F.3d 446.  The Sixth Circuit in Smith did not say that the test from Saroli is no longer applicable. 
Rather, the court in Smith explains how the district court read the intent requirement much too narrowly, in that it 
failed to account for any foreseeable consequences of the employer’s actions.  Smith, 727 F. App’x at 104.  
144 Elnashar v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 484 F.3d 1046, 1058 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Breeding v. Arthur J. 
Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1159 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Constructive discharge occurs when an employer 
deliberately creates ‘intolerable working conditions with the intention of forcing the employee to quit’ and the 
employee does quit.”) 
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standard will not consider the foreseeable consequences against the employee; rather, they will 
focus on the outcome the employer itself desired.145  However, when intent is critical, it is more 
likely that foreseeable consequences may be at least a factor in ascertaining employer intent.  
The ultimate problem for Smith in the district court was that she did “not allege facts that 
show Defendants did anything directly towards her to make her quit her job.”146  LHC never 
expressed any desire for her to quit, never changed her job title, and did not meet any of the seven 
factors listed above.147  Yet, she quit anyway because she objected to working for a company 
whose business model was centered on fraud.148  Another argument for the subjective intent 
standard in the False Claims Act context in Smith, revolved around a strict reading of the statute 
itself.149  The defendants argued that the False Claims Act’s anti-retaliatory provision specifically 
requires the employer to have a retaliatory motive when making an adverse employment action 
“because of the lawful acts done by the employee”.150  This seems to require some sort of intent 
element on the part of the employer, which is true in all whistleblower cases.   
It is clear how the subjective intent test makes the burden on the employee much more 
difficult to satisfy in court.  Given recent trends of trying to further protection for employees, it is 
no surprise that this subjective test is followed by only a minority of federal courts.151  It is also no 
surprise the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the Kentucky Eastern District Court’s understanding of 
the constructive discharge doctrine.  The Sixth Circuit ultimately disagreed with the lower court’s 
“narrow reading of intent” because it failed to account for the foreseeable consequences of the 
 
145 See Smith v. LHC Grp., Inc., 727 F. App’x 100, 104 (6th Cir. 2018) (“We disagree with the district court’s 
narrow reading of intent because it focuses only on the outcome LHC specifically desired—profits from the 
scheme—and fails to take into account the foreseeable consequences of their actions.”)  
146 Smith, 727 F. App’x at 102 (emphasis in original).  
147 Smith v. LHC Grp., Inc., No. 5:17-15-KKC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101742, at *8 (E.D. Ky. June 30, 2017).  
148 Id. at *9.  
149 Smith, 727 F. App’x at 106. 
150 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(h).  
151 XPERTHR EMPLOYMENT LAW MANUAL 3329 (2018). 
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employer’s actions.152  While the factors listed are a good way to analyze whether a constructive 
discharge occurred, they are not an exhaustive list, and the foreseeable consequences must be 
analyzed as well.  The Sixth Circuit also disagreed with the district court’s analysis of intolerable 
working conditions in Smith’s case—specifically that a jury could find that Smith’s employers 
created intolerable conditions by ignoring her fraud complaints.153 
D. Courts and Regulations Should Follow the Foreseeable Consequences 
Objective Test Used by the Sixth Circuit  
 
There are advantages and disadvantages to each of the three constructive discharge tests.  
One can understand how circuits are often split on which test to apply, especially given different 
judge or court tendencies towards being “employee-friendly” or “employer-friendly.”  Overall, it 
is difficult to prevail on a constructive discharge claim given the high level of proof necessary.154  
The objective standards make it more difficult for both employers and employees, but levels the 
playing field. Not only do employees’ subjective perception of the harassment or tolerability of 
work conditions not matter, but the employer’s subjective intent to force the employee to quit is 
also irrelevant.  The Sixth Circuit adopts what one can see is a fair “middle ground” approach that 
should be adopted court-wide and state-wide.  
In Smith, the Eastern District Court of Kentucky took a much too narrow view of “intention 
of forcing the employee to quit.”  The district court failed to consider the foreseeable consequence 
aspect of the objective test, and required deliberate intention on the employer’s part, thereby 
following the subjective intent test.  In fully analyzing the different outlooks on constructive 
discharge, courts should follow the Sixth Circuit’s lead in asking whether an employer could 
 
152 Smith v. LHC Grp., Inc., 727 F. App’x 100, 104 (6th Cir. 2018). 
153 Id.  
154 Id. 
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foresee that its behavior would lead to an employee’s resignation.  While the test is “objective,” it 
adds an extra, appropriate element for deciding whether or not the employer responded 
appropriately, or at the very least, could have foreseen that the employee might resign given the 
circumstances. 
In making the consideration to adopt the “foreseeable consequence” test, a few reasons for 
taking this stance stand out.  First, a court can “hardly be said to provide ‘all relief necessary’ if it 
should impose a subjective intent requirement.”155  In order to make the employee whole, the court 
needs to follow a test that will further enable it to find that the employer committed some wrong.  
Otherwise, negligent employers can escape liability simply because they did not “intend” to create 
unworkable conditions.  In Smith, taking the Plaintiff’s facts as true, LHC clearly violated the FCA 
with its encouragement of fraudulent activities.  If a subjective test were employed, there would 
be no way to show that Smith was constructively discharged and retaliated against for 
whistleblowing.  At no point did LHC encourage her to quit, demote her, or harass her in a way 
that made her physical presence intolerable.   
However, arguably no reasonable person can look at this case and say that Smith was not 
in some way forced to quit in order to avoid potential liability for fraud.  The court seems to take 
on a test just short of a “shock the conscience” standard with its final quote listed above (“a court 
can hardly be said to provide all relief necessary”).  Smith is entitled to relief and the only way she 
will receive it is if the court adopts this less stringent test in favor of the employee.  While this 
may be true, one might also argue that Smith is actually a radical decision by the Sixth Circuit.  An 
opponent of the constructive discharge doctrine applied in Smith could easily say that the 
 
155 Id. at 106.  
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employers did absolutely nothing to Smith.  While LHC allowed fraud to continue, they took no 
adverse action Smith herself.     
The defendants in Smith argued that a clear reading of the statute requires “retaliatory” 
motive when it says that the employer must take adverse employment action "because of lawful 
acts done by the employee" to counteract the employer's fraud.156  However, as the Sixth Circuit 
correctly points out, this reading of the statute directly contradicts the motive of the statute to make 
the employee “whole” following any discrimination on terms of employment.157  It is clear through 
the many statutes enacted to protect whistleblowers, and the rewards that come with successful 
claims of fraud, that both legislatures and the judiciary want to allow employees to feel guarded 
enough to come forward with their claims.  
Presumably one could argue that Smith would have had the same outcome if the Sixth 
Circuit followed the objective test without intent or foreseeability requirements. Courts currently 
treat the two tests as different, though more often than not both tests will likely lead to the same 
result.  If a reasonable employee would find it necessary to quit and notifies her employer of her 
concerns, generally a reasonable employer should be able to foresee that resignation is a reasonable 
consequence.   While true, there might be pitfalls to the strictly objective, reasonable person 
standard.  By neglecting to incorporate some sort of foreseeability for the employer, many 
companies might fall into the trap of being held liable for constructive discharge with very little 
warning signs—assuming the employer is not negligent in its handling of employee complaints.  
For example, imagine an employee who alerts her supervisor that she thinks the employer’s billing 
practices may be illegal.  This does not necessarily put the employer on notice that the employee 
may resign given potentially fraudulent billing practices.  If that employee quits before the 
 
156 Id. see also 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(h).  
157 Smith v. LHC Grp., Inc., 727 F. App’x 100, 106 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 25 
employer seeks to investigate the fraud and then brings a retaliation claim under FCA pretenses 
for violations of fraud that ring true, this employer could be held liable.  If there was a 
foreseeability requirement, however, the court would likely find otherwise, thereby protecting the 
employer appropriately.  
If a strictly objective or subjective test is used, there will likely be consequences for 
employees.  The test for finding subjective intent, as seen in the district court’s finding for Smith, 
creates a more stringent test for an employee to win on his or her claim. Rarely will there be direct 
evidence that an employer subjectively intended an employee to quit, as most employers do not 
shout from the rooftops that they purposely created intolerable work conditions for an employee.  
This may dissuade an employee from reporting the employer or going so far as to bring suit, given 
the chance that the employer can find a way to show that in no way did it intend for the employee 
to quit. Therefore, even in the subjective intent test it is likely foreseeability is at least a factor the 
court must consider.   
On the other side of the coin, a strictly objective test might be too lenient. As long as an 
employee puts forth enough evidence that he or she found the conditions intolerable in the same 
way a reasonable person might, the employer’s intentions or foreseeability do not play a role. One 
might be inclined to argue that if the workplace is objectively intolerable, then the employer should 
be held responsible to take notice and cure it.  However, given the broad scope of ways in which 
employment conditions can be intolerable unbeknownst “to the naked eye,” it seems unrealistic to 
expect employers to always know the exact moment working conditions become unfavorable for 
one particular employee.   Once the employee, such as Smith, reports the problem, the employer 
should foresee that a reasonable person might quit depending on the severity of the circumstances.  
Therefore, using the foreseeability test brings a balance between the two tests and for both parties. 
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The employee has more protection because she does not have to totally prove that the employer 
actively intended her resignation.  Likewise, the foreseeability rule gives the employer more of 
chance to act to make changes before the employee can sue. Rather than only looking at the 
perspective of a reasonable person following a complaint, the mental state of the employer is given 
a fair standard as well.  
While the court does not want to per se “encourage” whistleblowing, it also does not want 
to do the opposite.  The purpose of the False Claims Act is to protect the federal government from 
fraudulent activity and offer employees and the government itself recourse for such acts.158  
Employees who are aware of such fraudulent activity in their companies—activities that affect the 
federal government and therefore the nation as a whole—should feel protected enough by the law 
and implementation of standards in the court to take action to both leave their company and seek 
recovery.  With a wholly subjective standard, there is more room for an employee to second-guess 
whether her claim will succeed in court.  This test leaves more room for a “he-said, she-said” 
argument as to what the employer said and did to cause the employee to resign.  With an objective 
test with a foreseeability component, an employee may feel more comfortable taking the steps 
necessary to report such fraudulent acts and therefore help the government cease fraudulent 
schemes such as the one in Smith in the long run.  LHC allegedly gained about $6 million per year 
on its scheme—just one company alone cheating the government out of money that would not 
otherwise be realized if a lone employee did not bring her claim or, in the alternative, sue as a 
relator. 
VII. Future Legislation  
 
158 3 UNJUST DISMISSAL § 11.03 (2018). 
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 Moving forward, both federal and state lawmakers should consider a number of items when 
creating such statutes and legislation.  First and foremost, lawmakers should make sure it is clear 
in statutes and regulation which standard of constructive discharge will be applied.  Courts are 
constantly flooded with questions of statutory interpretation, which is why issues like the one 
surrounding constructive discharge arise in the first place.159  If the language in the statute clearly 
states a standard to be followed, then it will not be left up to judicial interpretation whether an 
objective or subjective standard should be met.  Along those same lines, retaliatory provisions 
protecting whistleblowers should explicitly state that constructive discharge is prohibited.160  The 
Sixth Circuit in Smith inferred that constructive discharge is included in the anti-retaliatory 
provisions of the False Claims Act, but it would make all courts’ jobs easier if there was 
unambiguous inclusion.161  It is worth noting that Smith is an unpublished opinion, meaning it 
lacks precedential value and will not bind courts going forward.  While this is surprising given the 
arguably radical decision, it only further shows the necessity of clear statutory standards going 
forward.  
 The next recommended course of action would be for states to adopt just one 
comprehensive whistleblower statute that covers all occupations and industries.  As of right now, 
there are several distinctions in jurisdictions among professions.  Not only are there numerous 
federal laws governing whistleblowers and retaliation, like Title VII, the False Claims Act, and 
SOX, to name a few, but states have also adopted their own collection of laws and statutes.  The 
New Jersey CEPA, for example, seems to be a comprehensive measure to protect 
 
159 See generally Carols E. Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C.L. REV. 585, 587 (1996). 
160 See Nguyen v. Tech. & Sci. Application, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 900, 901 (Tex. App. 1998) (“Several statutes prohibit 
the discharge of employees in certain circumstances. Even though no statute specifically allows relief for 
a constructive discharge, several courts have assumed that a constructive discharge would satisfy the discharge 
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whistleblowers.162  However, the New Jersey False Claims Act mentioned above also has 
provisions in place regarding whistleblowers.163  Consider the confusion it could create by having 
different statutes trying to accomplish the same goal in the same jurisdiction.  Adopting one broad 
and fully inclusive whistleblower statute will cause for less confliction among laws and further 
promote the public interest that coincides with whistleblower protection.  
 Lastly, as discussed in detail above, both federal and state governments should adopt a 
foreseeable consequence objective constructive discharge standard.  This test is the most balanced 
approach towards protecting employers and employees alike.  While it is not in the public’s best 
interest to have the courts flooded with frivolous whistleblower claims by disgruntled employees 
or those seeking to reap the benefits of a successful action, it is also not in the public’s best interest 
to have companies overstepping their bounds and getting away with acts like fraud and harassment 
in the workplace.  The foreseeable consequences objective test finds the right balance.  
VIII. Conclusion  
 As demonstrated through this note, there is much work to be done in the whistleblower, 
retaliation, and constructive discharge statutory schemes.  Both lawmakers and courts alike have 
come a long way in protecting employees during these claims.  By creating more comprehensive 
statutes and tightening up the standards that should be applied in court, both employees and 
employers’ expectations will be rightfully set and the government and public interests should be 
further aligned.  
 
162 N.J. Stat. § 34:19-3 (2018). 
163 N.J. Stat. § 2A:32C-1 – 2A:32C-18 (2018). 
